A look into the future:
the world by 2036

Productivity is the key decisive factor

What structural forces could have a significant impact on the economy and financial markets over the next ten years? Demographics, technological innovation, geopolitical fragmentation, climate change, and high levels of public debt are altering the growth potential of the global economy. At the same time, they are shaping inflation, interest rates, corporate earnings, and long-term capital market returns.

The key question is whether the high levels of investment in digitalisation, energy supply, infrastructure, defence, and economic resilience will trigger a broadly based increase in productivity. Artificial intelligence and automation can increase production potential. However, some of the additional investment is primarily intended to strengthen security, protect existing capacities against damage or build redundant supply chains. Whether the investment surge enables stronger growth in the long term or, above all, generates additional inflationary pressure therefore depends largely on its impact on productivity.

Unless otherwise stated, the following assumptions relate to the average across developed economies and capital markets.

Five structural forces

Digitalisation and artificial intelligence offer the chance of higher productivity growth. However, more powerful models and software alone are not enough to achieve this. Companies must adapt their processes, organisation, and skills. In addition, substantial investment is required in data centres, semiconductors, electricity grids, and data infrastructure. The impact on productivity is therefore likely to be gradual and uneven.

The ageing population is having the opposite effect in many developed economies and in China. A smaller labour supply limits growth, increases wage pressure and places a strain on public finances. At the same time, demographic trends are strengthening the incentive for automation.

Geopolitical fragmentation also increases capital requirements. Companies are diversifying their sources of supply, establishing additional supply chains and relocating strategically important production capacity. Globalisation is not disappearing, but it is becoming more regional and political. The resulting redundancies increase resilience but reduce the efficiency of the international division of labour.

Climate change effects its impact through physical damage and an increasing need for adaptation. Electricity grids, energy supplies, transport systems, buildings, and production sites must become more resilient. Such investments can safeguard future production potential by limiting damage and production losses. Their benefits are often reflected in avoided losses rather than in immediate additional cash flows.

High levels of government debt ultimately exacerbate conflicts of interest in economic policy. Investment needs in infrastructure, energy, digitalisation, and defence are rising, while higher interest rates are consuming a growing proportion of government revenue. The conflict between price stability, investment needs, and debt sustainability is likely to become more apparent.

A more investment-intensive growth model

In the most likely scenario of inflationary growth, the real potential growth of developed economies will average around 2% per year until 2036. This assumption, too, is already optimistic. It assumes that higher investment and rising productivity will more than offset the growth-dampening effects of demographic ageing.

The additional contribution to productivity from artificial intelligence is estimated at around 0.4 percentage points per year. Over ten years, this would increase potential output by a cumulative total of around 4%. This assumption therefore already implies a significant boost to macroeconomic productivity. A prerequisite for this is that artificial intelligence is not confined to individual technology companies, but is also used productively in industry, retail, and services.

Over a quarter of Germans surveyed for Statista Consumer Insights use tools based on artificial intelligence such as ChatGPT for everyday tasks. This places Germany in the lower mid-range in a country comparison. In India and China, more than half of those surveyed stated that they used AI tools in their daily lives. The proportion of respondents in ChatGPT’s home country, the USA, is relatively low at 26%.

Data as of 12/11/2026

The high level of investment demand initially boosts aggregate demand. If investment activity remains high in the long term and rises relative to the volume of available savings, the neutral real interest rate may also be structurally higher than it was in the 2010s. The recent rises in yields may partly reflect such a reassessment. However, long-term bond yields are also determined by inflation expectations, term premiums and fiscal risks.

What is created by investment is crucial to the longer-term growth path. Investment in automation, digital infrastructure, energy supply, and more efficient electricity grids can boost productivity and production capacity. Climate adaptation and economic resilience safeguard existing capacities against future damage. Defence spending enhances security and resilience but does not necessarily expand civilian production potential.

Inflation and interest rates remain higher and more volatile

The extremely low levels of inflation and interest rates seen in the 2010s were probably an exception. Fragmentation, an ageing population, climate risks, decarbonisation, defence, and higher government spending tend to have an inflationary effect.

The current investment boom in artificial intelligence also appears, at first glance, to be driving up prices. The expansion of data centres, semiconductor capacity, electricity grids, and energy supply increases demand for capital, labour, energy and raw materials, and may exacerbate bottlenecks. Only in the longer term is artificial intelligence likely to have a price-dampening effect, provided that its widespread application boosts productivity, reduces unit costs, and expands production potential.

It is unlikely that we will see persistently very high inflation rates, but rather higher average rates and greater fluctuations than before the pandemic. Supply shocks are likely to occur more frequently, while fiscal policy will increasingly be characterised by structural spending programmes. Inflation could therefore exceed central banks’ target levels even outside periods of classic economic overheating.

Central banks are likely to be less willing to combat supply-driven price pressures entirely at the cost of a recession. High public debt and rising interest expenditure increase the economic, fiscal, and political costs of restrictive monetary policy. Even without a formal abandonment of central bank independence, this creates a regime of partial fiscal dominance.

At the same time, the risk of creeping financial repression is increasing. Regulatory changes could make government bonds more attractive to banks, insurance companies, and other institutional investors. The resulting structural demand would make it easier for highly indebted countries to finance themselves. For investors, the burden could lie in nominal yields that lag behind inflation or nominal economic growth over a prolonged period.

Please note: investments in securities involve risks as well as opportunities. Forecasts are no reliable indicator of future performance.

Four possible regimes until 2036

The most likely scenario is inflationary growth, with a probability of 41%. Real potential growth stands at 2% and inflation at 3%. The neutral real interest rate is 0.5%, and the long-term yield on 10Y government bonds is 4.6%. Equities in developed markets are estimated to yield a nominal total return of 6.7% per year.

The most significant risk scenario is inflationary stagnation, with a probability of 34%. The investment surge does not trigger a broadly based rise in productivity. Real potential growth falls to 1.2%, while inflation stands at 3.5%. The yield on 10Y government bonds rises to 5.3%; meanwhile, the estimated equity return falls to 2.8%. Gold and energy perform particularly well in this environment.

Models suggest an 11% probability for disinflationary stagnation. Weaker investment, a possible bursting of the stock market bubble, and/or fiscal consolidation push real potential growth down to 1% and inflation to 1.5%. Nominal government bonds can benefit from falling yields, while equities achieve an estimated return of 4.3%.

In the positive scenario of disinflationary growth, with a probability of 14%, artificial intelligence and automation spread successfully throughout the economy. Real potential growth reaches 3%, with inflation standing at 2%. Equities achieve the highest return of the four scenarios at 8.3%.

Inflationary regimes are assigned a probability weighting of 75% overall. Portfolios should therefore not be geared exclusively towards falling inflation and falling interest rates.

Long-term capital market returns

Based on the four scenarios, the probability-weighted real potential growth is around 1.8%, and inflation is just under 2.9%. The average neutral real interest rate amounts to about 0.6%, while the long-term yield on 10Y government bonds is around 4.5%.

Money market investments yield a nominal return of 3.5%. Government bonds yield 4.5% and inflation-linked bonds 4.7%. With inflation at just under 2.9%, the return on nominal government bonds corresponds to an expected real return of about 1.6% per year. This would be attractive by long-term historical standards. However, the actual return depends on duration, inflation, and currency hedging.

For equities in developed markets, the probability-weighted nominal total return is 5.3 per cent. High starting valuations limit the potential for further rises in valuations. A larger proportion of future returns must therefore come from earnings growth, dividends and share buybacks.

Investment-grade corporate bonds are projected to yield 5.6% in the model, while high-yield bonds should yield 7%. Rates of return are estimated at 5.7% for property, at 4.9% for gold, and at 5.8% for energy. However, the average figures mask significant differences between the scenarios. Gold and energy benefit particularly from inflationary stagnation, whereas nominal government bonds primarily provide stability in the event of disinflationary growth shocks.

Consequences for long-term portfolios

Equities remain the most important driver of long-term returns. The expected rate of return of 5.3% suggests that the exceptional performance of the past decade is unlikely to continue. At the same time, differences between regions, sectors, and individual companies are likely to increase.

Following the rise in yields, nominal government bonds are once again offering significant current income. An expected real return of around 1.6% enhances their strategic appeal. High-quality government bonds can stabilise portfolios during growth slowdowns and disinflationary shocks. In the event of inflationary and supply shocks, however, this protection is less reliable, as share and bond prices may fall simultaneously.

Inflation-linked bonds offer more direct protection against unexpected inflation. Gold and commodities can further stabilise portfolios during periods of inflationary stress. Their role stems less from their average return than from their behaviour in scenarios where nominal equities and bonds come under pressure simultaneously.

Conclusion

The next ten years are likely to be characterised by high levels of investment, greater economic fragmentation, and wider fluctuations in inflation and interest rates. The most likely scenario remains inflationary growth. However, the risk of stagflation is considerable.

Whether developed economies can cope with these challenges will depend largely on productivity. An additional annual contribution from AI of 0.4 percentage points would already represent a significant boost to macroeconomic productivity. If the uptake of artificial intelligence falls short of these expectations, the investment boom will initially boost GDP but will not raise the long-term growth trajectory to the same extent.

For developed capital markets, this means positive, but likely lower, equity returns than the historical average. Government bonds once again offer an attractive real yield and can provide stability in the event of disinflationary growth shocks. Against inflationary shocks, inflation-linked bonds, gold and commodities remain important complementary assets.

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Disclaimer

This document is an advertisement. Please refer to the prospectus of the UCITS or to the Information for Investors pursuant to Art 21 AIFMG of the alternative investment fund and the Key Information Document before making any final investment decisions. Unless indicated otherwise, source: Erste Asset Management GmbH. Our languages of communication are German and English.

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